Филозофија

Не постоје подаци о траженом курсу.
Литература и извори података:
Општа обавезна литература
Dekart, Rene. (2012). Metafizičke meditacije, Beograd: Zavod za udžbenike.
Chalmers, David. (2002). “Does Conceivability Entail Possibility?”, in T. Gendler and J. Hawthorne (eds.). Conceivability and Possibility, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Gregory, Dominic. (2010). “Conceivability and Apparent Possibility”, in B. Hale and A. Hoffmann (eds.), Modality: Metaphysics, Logic and Epistemology, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Bealer, George. “Modal Epistemology and Rationalist Renaissance”, in T. Gendler and J. Hawthorne (eds.). Conceivability and Possibility, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Hale, Bob. (2002). “Knowledge of Possibility and of Necessity”, Proceedings of Aristotelian Society, 103: 1–20.
Ichikawa, Jonathan and Jarvis, Benjamin. (2012), “Rational Imagination and Modal Knowledge”, Nous, 46: 127–158.
Kripke, Saul. (1992). Identitet i nužnost, u Ž. Lazović i A. Pavković (prir.), Ogledi o jeziku i značenju, Beograd: FDS.
Van Inwagen, Robert. (1998). ”Modal Epistemology”, Philosophical Studies, 92: 67–84.
Biggs, Stephen. (2011), “Abduction and Modality”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 83: 283–326.
Roca-Royes, Sonia. (2011).”Conceivability and De Re Modal Knowledge”, Nous, 45: 22–49.
Vaidya, Anand. (2008). “Modal Monism and Modal Rationalism”, Erkenntnis, 68: 191–212.
Vaidya, Anand. (2010). “Understanding and Essence”, Philosophia, 811–833.
Yablo, Stephen. (1993), “Is Conceivability a Guide to Possibility?”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 53: 1–42.
Општа допунска литература
Garcia-Carpintero, Manuel and Macia, Josep (eds.). (2006). Two-Dimensional Semantics: Foundations and Applications, Oxford: Oxford University Press (izbor tekstova).
Gendler, Tamar and Hawthorne, John. (eds.). Conceivability and Possibility, Oxford: Oxford University Press (izbor tekstova).
Hale, Bob and Hoffmann, Aviv. (2010), Modality: Metaphysics, Logic and Epistemology, Oxford: Oxford University Press (izbor tekstova).
Prelević, Duško. (2011). „Čalmersova odbrana argumenta na osnovu zamislivosti”, Theoria, 54/2: 25–55.
Prelević, Duško. (2013). Modalna epistemologija i eksplanatorni jaz: značaj argumenta na osnovu zamislivosti zombija, doktorska disertacija, Beograd: Filozofski fakultet.
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