

DRAFT

Xenophon and the soul of the rulers

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Abstract

In this brief essay I will pose an interpretation of Cyrus' psychology in Xenophon's *Cyropaedia*. My point of departure is that Cyrus' psychological structure is composed of a set of three desires (*philotimía*, *philanthropía*, *philomatheía*) given by nature and one virtue (*sophrosúne/enkrátēia*) acquired by education. I will argue that Cyrus, as an enkratic ruler, does not long for any kind of honors, but he is guided by *philotimía*, that is, the desire for true honors —honors freely given by gratitude or admiration. *Philanthropía* is the key to achieve these honors, since it naturally prompts benevolent and generous behavior that elicits gratitude and admiration. At the same time, *philomatheia* provides the desire for knowledge necessary to acquire the techniques that enable one to accomplish ambitious and philanthropic deeds. Therefore, unlike those who have posited negative interpretations of Cyrus, I will argue that the uncommon combination of these psychological predispositions makes Cyrus a virtuous ruler.

The exploration of psychology in relation to political performance is one of the hallmarks of the philosophical writings of the Socratic circle. Probably the most well-known reference is Plato's *Republic* IV, VIII and IX, where the philosopher proposes a way of understanding politics on the basis of human psychology. Within the surviving work of the Socratic circle, Xenophon offers the most detailed discussion of the characteristics of a ruler, specifically the monarch. Cyrus is the emblematic case, and Xenophon has devoted his most extensive work to depicting him. *Cyropaedia* is not just a novel¹ but a fictionalized political treatise, a *roman philosophique*, in which core issues about ruling are addressed²— so much so that in the last decade of the XVIth century Edmund Spenser said in his *The Faerie Queene*:

For this cause is Xenophon preferred before Plato, for that the one in the exquisite depth of his judgement formed a commonwealth such as it should be, but the other in the person of Cyrus and the Persians fashioned a government such as might best be. So much more profitable and gracious is doctrine by example than by rule³.

If Xenophon and Plato deal with the same political issues, we can pose the same question to both of them: What is the combination of psychological qualities necessary for a person to function as an effective ruler?

The last three decades have seen an increase in the studies on *Cyropaedia*, which is slowly recovering the historical importance that it once had⁴. These investigations have focused on how we

1 J. Tatum, *Xenophons Imperial Fiction. On the Education of Cyrus* (Princeton, 1989), pp. 36-74 and F.

Létoublon and S. Montanari, 'Le prince idéal de la Cyropédie ou l'histoire est un roman', in *Passions, vertus et vices dans l'ancien roman. Actes du colloque de Tours* (Lyon, 2009), 39-49.

2 C. Nadon, *Xenophon's Prince. Republic and Empire in the Cyropaedia*. (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 2001), 24.

3 Spenser, *The Faerie Queene*, 75. See Nadon (n.2), 24. and A. Low, "'Plato, and his Equall Xenophon": A Note on Milton's Apology for Smetymnuus', *Milton Quarterly* 4 (1970), 20-2.

4 See Tatum (n.1), 3-35, and especially for the eighteenth-century D. Ahn, 'The politics of royal education: Xenophon's Education of Cyrus in early eighteenth-century Europe', *The Leadership Quarterly* 19 (2008),

should understand Cyrus and his empire. In general, positions vary between understanding Cyrus as a despotic tyrant and as an admirable ruler. Since Xenophon praises Cyrus explicitly, negative interpretations are largely influenced by the 'ironic' readings initiated by Leo Strauss⁵⁶.

The topic of the ruler's psychology has recently engendered a debate that reflects these general views regarding *Cyropaedia*. However, while there have been those who argue that Cyrus has a completely corrupt *psukhé*⁷, other authors have argued that understanding Cyrus' psychology leads to more nuanced and ambivalent evaluations of his monarchy, as is shown by the works of Faulkner⁸, Danzig⁹, Bartlett¹⁰ and Smith Pangle¹¹.

Faulkner has argued that Cyrus' main motive is ambition; although his rule brings economic well-being to society, this is done in order to reinforce his own superiority¹². In Falkner's view, Cyrus' ambition is completely rational and for this reason *Cyropaedia* effectively proposes the most just, noble and beneficial form in which it is possible to develop such a great ambition¹³. Danzig has masterfully devoted himself to showing that there is no contradiction between self-interest and social interest. Refuting those who have claimed that Cyrus acts by pure egoism, he has shown the sincerity of Cyrus *philanthropía* and that there is no contradiction between this *philanthropía* and self-interest¹⁴. While Bartlett argues that the core of Cyrus' desires lies in a concern for justice¹⁵,

439-52.

5 The first example of this is L. Strauss, 'The spirit of Sparta or the taste of Xenophon', *Social Research* 6 (1939), 502-36. See L.-A., Dorion, 'L'exégèse straussienne de Xénophon: le cas paradigmatique de Mémoires IV 4', in M. Narcy & A. Lacks (edd.), *Figures de Socrate* (Villeneuve-d'Ascq, 2001), 87-117, and D. Johnson, 'Strauss on Xenophon', in F. Hobden & C. Tuplin, *Xenophon: Ethical Principles and Historical Enquiry* (Leiden, 2012), 123-159.

6 In the negative side of the spectrum: P. Carlier, 'The Idea of Imperial Monarchy in Xenophon's *Cyropaedia*', in V. Gray, *Oxford Readings in Classical Studies. Xenophon* (Oxford, 2010), 327-366 = P. Carlier, 'L'idée de monarchie imperiale dans la *Cyropédie* de Xénophon', *Ktema* 3 (1978), 133-63, the Straussian readings: W.R., Newell, 'Tyranny and the Science of Ruling in Xenophon's "Education of Cyrus"', *The Journal of Politics* 45 (1983), 889-906; 'Machiavelli and Xenophon on Princely Rule: A Double-Edged Encounter', *The Journal of Politics* 50 (1988), 108-130, and *Tyranny. A New Interpretation* (Cambridge, 2013), 186-270; L. Rubin, 'Love and Politics in Xenophon's *Cyropaedia*', *Interpretation* 16 (1989), 391-414; C. Nadon, 'From Republic to Empire: Political Revolution and the Common Good in Xenophon's Education of Cyrus', *The American Political Science Review* 90 (1996), 361-74 and Nadon (n.2); J. Reiser, 'Ambition and Corruption in Xenophon's Education of Cyrus', *Polis* 26 (2009), 296-315; C. Whidden, 'The Account of Persia and Cyrus's Persian Education in Xenophon's "Cyropaedia"', *The Review of Politics* 69 (2007), 539-67; L. Field, 'Xenophon's *Cyropaedia*: Educating our Political Hopes', *The Journal of Politics* 74 (2012), 723-738. Also there are negative interpretations that digress from the Straussian interpretations: D. Johnson, 'Persian as Centaurs in Xenophon's "Cyropaedia"', *Transactions of the American Philological Association* (1974-) 135 (2005), pp. 177-207, at 204. The positive side of the spectrum has more nuances: Tatum (n.1); B. Due, *The Cyropaedia. Xenophon's Aims and Methods* (Aarhus, 1989); D. Gera, *Xenophon's Cyropaedia: Style, Genre, and Literary Technique* (Oxford, 1993); C. Mueller-Goldingen, *Untersuchungen zu Xenophons Kyropadie* (Stuttgart and Leipzig, 1995); V. Gray, *Xenophon's Mirror of Princes. Reading the Reflections* (Oxford, 2011), 246-90; G. Danzig, 'The Best of The Achaemenids: Benevolence, Self-Interest and the "Ironic" Reading of *Cyropaedia*', in F. Hobden & C. Tuplin, *Xenophon: Ethical Principles and Historical Enquiry* (Leiden, 2012), 499-540; and N. Sandridge, *Loving Humanity, Learning, and Being Honored. The Foundations of Leadership in Xenophon's Education of Cyrus* (Princeton, 2012). M. Tamiolaki, 'Xenophon's *Cyropaedia*: Tentative Answers to an Enigma', in M.A. Flower (ed), *The Cambridge Companion to Xenophon* (Cambridge and New York, 2016), 174-194, at 190, has divided *Cyropaedia* studies in three lines of approach: a) "ironic" interpretations = critique of empire and/or of political life *tout court*; b) wholly positives interpretations; c) ambivalent or/and pragmatic interpretations.

7 Reiser (n. 6), Whidden (n. 6).

8 R. Faulkner, *The Case for Greatness: Honorable Ambition and Its Critics* (New Haven, 2007).

9 Danzig (n. 6).

10 R. Bartlett, 'How to Rule the World: An Introduction to Xenophon's The Education of Cyrus', *American Political Science Review* 109 (2015), 143-54.

11 L. Smith Pangle, 'Xenophon on the Psychology of Supreme Political Ambition', *American Political Science Review* 111 (2017), 308-21.

12 Faulkner (n. 8), 134-140.

13 Ibid., 130. From a negative interpretation of Cyrus, this is also Johnson's (n.6), 202 perspective: "[Cyrus] indeed has many virtues and few vices, at least few vices not necessary to the single-minded pursuit of his goal, empire".

14 Danzig (n. 6), 509-511. Also Sandridge (n.6), 37.

15 Bartlett (n. 10), 146-7.

Smith Pangle holds that Cyrus' main motive is to become a quasi-divine benefactor, a great godlike provider¹⁶. His desiderative kernel is, therefore, his excessive ambition and search for recognition. In that sense, every form of benevolence is marked by self-interest¹⁷.

Our intention is to propose an explanation for Cyrus' psychology based on three natural desires (*philotimía*, *philanthropía*, *philomatheía*)¹⁸ and an acquired virtue (*sophrosúne* / *enktráteia*). We aim to show how Cyrus' extraordinary capacity lies in a virtuous feedback initiated by the quest to satisfy his own desires. He possesses a unique psychological structure, [which establishes a course of action where the pursuit of his desires necessarily leads to a political practice] — the establishment of a benevolent and stable rule. Cyrus' aim is not altruistic or naive, and his activity is marked by calculation and manipulation, but precisely these characteristics of his political practice bring well-being to himself and also to the society he rules.

The psychology of the rulers

At the beginning of *Cyropaedia* Xenophon explains the reason for his work: Cyrus is the only example of a successful ruler he manages to find. Xenophon insists that we must look for Cyrus' exceptional nature in his essential traits: his physical and psychological nature (“φύσιν μὲν δὴ τῆς μορφῆς καὶ τῆς ψυχῆς τοιαύτην ἔχων διαμνημονεύεται”, I.2.2.1-2), as summarized in I.2.1:

φῶναι δὲ ὁ Κῦρος λέγεται καὶ ᾄδεται ἔτι καὶ νῦν ὑπὸ τῶν βαρβάρων εἶδος μὲν κάλλιστος, ψυχὴν δὲ φιλανθρωπότατος καὶ φιλομαθέστατος καὶ φιλοτιμότατος, ὥστε πάντα μὲν πόνον ἀνατλήναι, πάντα δὲ κίνδυνον ὑπομῆναι τοῦ ἐπαινεῖσθαι ἕνεκα (I.2.1.6-9)

As to his nature, even now Cyrus is still described in word and song by the barbarians as having been most beautiful in form and most benevolent in soul, most eager to learn, and most ambitious, with the result that he endured every labor and faced every risk for the sake of being praised.^{19*}

The somatic characteristics (the ability to withstand fatigue and dangers) respond to the psychological ones, which are presented as the fundamental basis of Cyrus' nature. There are three superlative psychological features which indicate a particular orientation of the desiderative structure: generosity, altruism, or love for humanity (*philanthropía*), ambition or love for honors or recognition (*philotimía*), and love for learning, knowledge, or study (*philomatheía*). The exceptional disposition of Cyrus' political nature is defined by a *psúkhé* shaped by these three most powerful desires²⁰. The relevance of this psychology for the character of the good ruler also appears in the *Agesilaus*. The performance that makes the Spartan king a figure worthy of praise has its cause in a virtuous psychological structure, marked by a proper desiderative predisposition of his *psukhé* (*Ages.*, III.1.4-2.²¹).

The issue of ruler's *psukhé* is also developed in the *Hiero*. At its beginning, Simonides the

16 See also V. Azoulay, 'Xénophon et le modèle divin de l'autorité', *Cahiers des études anciennes* 45 (2008), 151-183.

17 Smith Pangle (n. 11), 318

18 Sandridge (n. 6) has thoughtfully analyzed these virtues, which are for him the basis of Cyrus' leadership. Despite taking here a different approach, I have benefited from his work.

19 Trans. W.Ambler, *Xenophon. The Education of Cyrus* (Ithaca and London, 2001).

20 The extraordinary nature of Cyrus' *psukhé* is also recognized by some *Cyropaedia* characters: IV.2.14, V.4.11. See Faulker (n. 8), 135. For piety as a fourth trait, see M. Flower, 'Piety in Xenophon's Theory of Leadership', *Histos Supplement* 5 (2016), 85-119, at 103.

21 “νῦν δὲ τὴν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ αὐτοῦ ἀρετὴν πειρὰ σομαι δηλοῦν, δι' ἣν ταῦτα ἐπραττε καὶ πάντων τῶν καλῶν ἦρα καὶ πάντα <τὰ> αἰσχρὰ ἐξεδίωκεν” “[I] will attempt to show the virtue that was in his soul, the virtue through which he wrought those deeds and loved all that is honourable and put away all that is base”

poet proposes a differentiation between individuals according to their political role. Common citizens and rulers present two different kinds of life, two ways of processing pleasures and pains — primordial sensations that organize life. These sensations can be experienced by the body, by the *psukhé*, or by both (*Hier.*, I.5). For example, the displeasure of extreme cold is perceived by the body, while kind words are lived as pleasurable by the *psukhé*, and a literal backstab by a friend is suffered by both the body and *psukhé*. This distinction between desires in *Hiero* is important because of the philosophical contexts in which Xenophon writes. Aristippus held that there are only somatic pleasures (DL, II.86-88 = *SSR*, VI.A.172 = *FS*, 589), and this leads to abandon all political participation (*Mem*, II.1.1-7). Xenophon needs to introduce the distinction in order to argue that a ruler with proper orientation of the soul can live a pleasant life according to his desires, achieving pleasures that, unlike cirenaic pleasures, are not only somatic but also psychological. From this differentiation, the dialogue presents a debate about who lives the life of greater pleasure: the common citizen (*Hiero*'s position) or the ruler (*Simonides*' position)²².

Although the differentiation between these human types appears exclusively related to the living conditions of individuals, it soon becomes evident that social context organizes the demands and perceptions of desires and their satisfaction, effectively shaping these psychological structure²³. Since the *psukhé* is the seat and origin of ἐπιθυμήματα (*Hier.*, I.23), an important part of the psychological structure changes according to experiences that, of course, are different for rulers and common citizens. There is, however, an exclusive desire or impulse of the rulers (and of those who aspire to rule), independent of context: the desire for honor (VII, 1-3)²⁴. The desire for honor is a natural psychological trait of those who rule, and the pursuit of this supreme pleasure is the reason why a ruler undergoes all kinds of inclemencies. The occurrence of this natural psychological feature in a ruler serves as a response and reformulation to the initial question asked by the *Simonides*: “Why do many desire to rule?” (“πῶς ἂν πολλοὶ μὲν ἐπεθύμουν τυραννεῖν”, I.9.2-3). In fact, this desire of the majority is based on a false image of ruling, which is presumed pleasant; after the exposition of *Hiero* makes clear that there is nothing desirable in ruling, the *philotimia* seems to raise a new and tacit question: “How should ruling be an object of desire for a ruler?” (Cf. VII.3-4)

Hence, in the *Hiero*, the psychological structure of a ruler has two desiderative levels: (i) a stable section, given by nature, marked by the desire for honor, which promotes the pursuit of rulership, and (ii) a broad mutable section, altered by experience and dependent on the ability to control unnecessary desires. The debate on rulers' pleasures revolves around this last point, since *Hiero* says that it is the very ruler's lifestyle —negatively altering the experience of pleasures— that corrupts a ruler's *psukhé*²⁵. In fact, *Simonides*' overriding proposal in his 'guide to political rule'

22 “ὁ Ἱέρων ἀπεκρίνατο· Ἐγὼ μὲν τοίνυν, ἔφη, ὦ Σιμωνίδη, ἔξω τούτων ὧν εἴρηκας σύγε οὐδ' ὅπως ἂν αἰσθητοῦ τινος ἄλλου ὁ τύραννος ἔχοιμ' ἂν εἰπεῖν, ὥστε μέχρι γε τούτου οὐκ οἶδ' εἶ τι διαφέρει ὁ τυραννικὸς βίος τοῦ ιδιωτικοῦ βίου. καὶ ὁ Σιμωνίδης εἶπεν· Ἄλλ' ἐν τοῖσδε, ἔφη, διαφέρει· πολλαπλάσια μὲν δι' ἑκάστου τούτων εὐφραίνεται, πολὺ δὲ μείω τὰ λυπηρὰ ἔχει. καὶ ὁ Ἱέρων εἶπεν· Οὐχ οὕτως ἔχει, ὦ Σιμωνίδη, ταῦτα, ἀλλ' εὖ ἴσθ' ὅτι μείω πολὺ εὐφραίνονται οἱ τύραννοι τῶν μετρίως διαγόντων ιδιωτῶν, πολὺ δὲ πλείω καὶ μείζω λυποῦνται” (1.7.1-1.9.1)

“For my part, *Simonides*,” said *Hiero* in answer to this, “I cannot say how a despot could have any sensations apart from those you have mentioned. So far, therefore, I fail to see that the despot's life differs in any respect from the citizen's.” “In this respect it does differ,” said *Simonides*: “the pleasures it experiences by means of these various organs are infinitely greater in number, and the pains it undergoes are far fewer.” “It is not so, *Simonides*,” retorted *Hiero*; “I assure you far fewer pleasures fall to despots than to citizens of modest means, and many more and much greater pains.” “Incredible!” exclaimed *Simonides*. “Were it so, how should a despot's throne be an object of desire to many, even of those who are reputed to be men of ample means? And how should all the world envy despots?”

23 e.g. *Hiero*, I.23

24 Newell (n. 6, 1983), 892, has argued that here the mass of humans beings is characterized aslike beasts or animals, and that is also the case of *Cyropaedia*. C. Mársico, R. Illarraga and P. Marzocca, *Jenofonte, La constitución de los lacedemonios, Hieron. Pseudo-Jenofonte, La constitución de los atenienses* (Buenos Aires, 2017), 99 n. 71 have answer that in this context Xenophon is not looking for an universal definition, but describing “a human feature that helps to find the differences between rulers and common citizens”.

25 Broadly speaking, the central part of the dialogue (I.9-VII.13) deals with the debate on ruler's pleasures. Mársico et. al. (n. 21), 93, have organized this in the following way: “(A) I.9-38 Personal disadvantages (I.9-16, regarding sensory pleasures; I.17-15, regarding food; II.26-38, regarding sexuality); (B) Social disadvantages(II.1-18,

(IX-XI) is to establish a political course that allows the good development of moderate pleasures (ii) and, more importantly, that actually achieve the desire of honor (i) by the most authentic honor — the genuine love of the subjects²⁶:

“κἄν ταῦτα πάντα ποιῆς, εὖ ἴσθι, πάντων τῶν ἐν ἀνθρώποις κάλλιστον καὶ μακαριώτατον κτῆμα κεκτήσει· εὐδαιμονῶν γὰρ οὐ φθονηθήσῃ” (11.15.2-4)

“And if you do all these things, rest assured that you will be possessed of the fairest and most blessed possession in the world; for none will be jealous of your happiness”

Furthermore, the good ruler that Socrates presents in *Memorabilia* II.1.1-7 (and which Aristippus, despite identifying this ruler as 'foolish', recognizes as the best possible ruler²⁷) is marked by the way he manages his desires, that is, his psychological structure²⁸. In this case, the psychological characteristic indicated is the *enkráteia*, which allows the ruler to put social needs ahead of his own²⁹.

In short, these references to the ruler's *psukhé* support what Xenophon himself said at the beginning of *Cyropaedia*: in order to maintain power effectively, and in order to do it virtuously, a particular psychological structure is needed. The *Agesilaus* insists on this idea, whereas the *Hiero* presents a reflection on psychology that could be read along with *Cyropaedia*, wherein they describe both fixed and mutable psychological traits. For its part, *Memorabilia* marks precisely the psychological trait necessary for being a good ruler, that is, a ruler who prioritizes the interest of the society he rules over his own: self-control.

The desire to rule: *philotimía*

One of the three superlative desires that characterize the nature of Cyrus' extraordinary *psukhé* forms the basis of rulers' psychology according to the *Hiero*: *philotimía*. In chapter VII of this dialogue, Simonides accepts the long-suffering role of the ruler held by *Hiero* and proposes a reason for pursuing rulership despite its inherent hardships. What differentiates rulers from the rest of humanity is the extraordinary drive for a pleasure more divine than human: *philotimía* (VII.3).

Philotimía is not only love for honor, but also for approval (“οἷς δ' ἂν ἐμφύη τιμῆς τε καὶ ἐπαίνου ἔρως”, VII.3.5-7). We are, therefore, faced with a desire that is concerned with form (gestures of reverence, performance of submission, etc.) as well as content: the *philotimós* finds pleasure in an authentic recognition by others. This makes it possible to make a distinction between the desire for false honors (hence, false *philotimía*) honors which are delivered out of obligation— and the true honors which are the ambition of the authentic *philotimía*³⁰:

“ὅταν γὰρ ἄνθρωποι ἄνδρα ἡγησάμενοι εὐεργετεῖν ἱκανὸν εἶναι, καὶ ἀπολαύειν αὐτοῦ ἀγαθὰ νομίσαντες, ἔπειτα τοῦτον ἀνὰ στόμα τε ἔχωσιν

regarding wealth; III.1-9, regarding friendship; IV.1-11, regarding confidence in others; V.1-4, regarding the quality of friend; VI.13, entertainment and social gatherings; VI.4-16, fear; VII.1-13, honor”.

26 In *Mem.* IV.6.12-3 tyranny is distinguished from monarchy for two reasons: the tyrant rules without consent and acts outside the law. The advice of Simonides seems to lead to a hybrid between tyranny and monarchy, where the ruler is above the law (*Cyr* I.3.18, or he is the law: VIII, 1.22) but therein also exists some kind of mutual consent between ruler and ruled, with its origin in the good deeds of the ruler.

27 See R. Illarraga, 'Enkráteia y gobierno. El gobernante insensato de Aristipo y su aparición en *Ciropedia*', *Méthexis* 30, 1-24..

28 Regarding Socrates influence in *Cyropaedia*: Due (n. 6), 198-203; Gera (n. 6), 26-141; P. Rasmussen, *Excellence Unleashed: Machiavelli's Critique of Xenophon and the Moral Foundation of Politics* (Lanham, 2009), 81-97; and Sandridge (n. 6), 35-36.

29 See Faulkner (n. 8), 138.

30 Reiser (n. 6), 300 holds that Hiero “longs to be loved indiscriminately by the human beings in his city”. This is simply inaccurate, as Hiero wants to be loved not indiscriminately, but for his good deeds.

ἐπαινοῦντες, θεῶνται τ' αὐτὸν ὡς οἰκεῖον ἕκαστος ἀγαθόν, ἐκόντες τε παραχωρῶσι τούτῳ ὁδῶν καὶ θάκων ὑπανιστῶνται φιλοῦντές τε καὶ μὴ φοβούμενοι, καὶ στεφανῶσι κοινῆς ἀρετῆς καὶ εὐεργεσίας ἔνεκα, καὶ δωρεῖσθαι ἐθέλωσιν, οἱ αὐτοὶ οὗτοι ἔμοιγε δοκοῦσι τιμᾶν τε τοῦτον ἀληθῶς οἱ ἂν τοιαῦτα ὑπουργήσωσι καὶ ὁ τούτων ἀξιούμενος τιμᾶσθαι τῷ ὄντι.” (VII.9)

“For whenever men feel that some person is competent to be their benefactor, and come to regard him as the fountain of blessings, so that henceforward his praise is ever on their lips, every one of them looks on him as his peculiar blessing, they make way for him spontaneously and rise from their seats, through love and not through fear, crown him for his generosity and beneficence, and bring him freewill offerings, these same men in my opinion, honour that person truly by such services, and he who is accounted worthy of them is honoured in very deed”

The *philotimós* ruler is virtuous by his own desire; honors are true only if they are freely given and, therefore, in order to achieve them, exemplary behavior marked by good social deeds is required. Although Xenophon does not speak explicitly of rulers without *philotimia* in the *Hiero*, we can think about them. Since *philotimia* is the desire to rule in spite of its intrinsic difficulties, there are two possible cases of *aphilótimoι* rulers: (a) naive rulers, ignorant of the problems they will face and without desires that encourage their resolution (and thus, the continuity of their rule), and (b) rulers with false *philotimia*, whose unjust desires lead to socially despised courses of action. In both cases, the complex situation (ruling without a good desire) is eventually perceived, but it is impossible to abandon the rule itself: what has been done to obtain and maintain the power generates a resentment that makes it impossible for the ruler to return to the situation of vulnerability and defenselessness of the common citizen (VII.11- 12).

The previous description of *philotimia* corresponds with the political notions held by the *philotimótatos* Cyrus. The type of honors sought by him and the means by which he achieves them are consistent with the 'political programs' recommended by Cambyses to Cyrus, who maintains the importance of giving the governed a good life (I.6.7-8), and by Cyrus to his children (VIII.7.7, 13). In this last section, in a more pragmatic way than that of the *Hiero*, the old king insists on how εὐεργεσία, and not violence, is the foundation for the recognition and fidelity of a ruler's subjects.

The exceptional nature of Cyrus appears already in his early years, to the point that his reputation reaches the court of his grandfather Astiages. After his arrival at Media, Cyrus' *philotimia* manifests itself in his equestrian practice, foreign to the Persian world (I.3.3). This childhood version of *philotimia* still does not represent a political development and remains in a personal sphere, but its form is already virtuous: Cyrus seeks the true honors that are obtained from effective practices (in this case, through the constant practice of horse-riding that will make him a competent horseman, Cf. I.3.15), when he could have been satisfied with enjoying the courtly compliments derived from being the King's grandson.

With the passing of the years and the advent of adolescence, Cyrus' *philotimia* acquires political (or, at least, proto-political) scopes —the desire for honor and the means to acquire it now operates on the large group of companions of the prince, noble's sons educated in the royal palace (I.4.1). Cyrus achieves reception and recognition by this group thanks to a remarkable example of εὐεργεσία, for example he makes visits to his companions where he shows his affection to them, earns for his companions the King's favor, and also obtains those things that they request. All of these practices (together with his repulse of the Assyrians' attack, I.4.18-24) make his quest for honor and recognition successful: years later Cyrus leaves Astiages' kingdom surrounded by a Median court that says goodbye to him with heartfelt tears and gifts.

The proposal of Due³¹, that in the first speech to the peers or *homótimoι* (I.5.12) “ἐπαίνου

ἐραστὰ” represents *philotimía*, fits perfectly with the appearance of that expression in *Hiero*, VII.3.4-5. At *Cyropaedia*, Cyrus says:

“ἐπαινούμενοι γὰρ μᾶλλον ἢ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἅπασι χαίρετε. τοὺς δ' ἐπαίνου
ἐραστὰς ἀνάγκη διὰ τοῦτο πάντα μὲν πόνον, πάντα δὲ κίνδυνον ἠδέως
ὑποδύεσθαι” (I.5.12)

“You rejoice more than all other men when you are praised. Those who long for praise necessarily undertake all toil and danger with pleasure because of this.”

The words of the young prince to his Persian peers at the beginning of the military campaign contain the same spirit as those spoken by Simonides, especially if we bear in mind that the *homótimoi* are the Persian ruling class. As in the case of *Hiero*'s rulers, the desire for approval or social recognition leads necessarily and pleasantly to the pursuit of a laborious³² course of action. The receipt of well-deserved praise after hard effort is a source of rejoicing for those who are marked by a virtuous psychological commitment³³.

Philotimía in its superlative degree also has a pejorative appearance in the *corpus xenophonticum* that we must mention³⁴. In the context of criticising Socrates for his companions, in *Memorabilia*, I.2.14, it is said that Alcibiades and Critias were the most *philotimoi* of the Athenians, which compelled them to seek mastery over the politics of their city and pursue fame. The peculiarities of the specific context in which this is said negatively make it necessary to elaborate here, given our previous virtuous characterization of *philotimía*.

In the first place, it is necessary to point out the difference that exists in how *philotimía* develops in the interaction between equals versus *philotimía* in a hierarchical political framework. Indeed, Xenophon is describing the roles of Alcibiades and Critias in the Athenian democracy of his time which was a political system of relative equality. In *Cyropaedia* III.3.10 *philotimía* similarly appears as a cause of rivalry and conflict on a horizontal social plane: the army in times of peace. Without conflicts that project the search for honors onto an external object and without a clearly vertical social plane reproduced permanently, the desire to stand out and be recognized becomes perverted and translates into social confrontations. Recognizing the positive power behind *philotimía* only in a clearly hierarchical social structure, Cyrus enacts a double social correction: in addition to initiating a military campaign to displace inherent soldierly rivalry from peers to enemies, he reorganizes the army so that the hierarchies are well established and there are no ambivalences or voids in the chain of command (*Cyr.* III.3.11). This virtuous reconversion of corrupted *philotimía* is possible because of a context of clear hierarchy, and contrasts with the more horizontal Athenian democracy, where Alcibiades and Critias' perverted *philotimía* develops uncontained³⁵.

There is a second point, which is related to the distinction we have made between false *philotimía* and true *philotimía*. As we have pointed out, true *philotimía* not only contemplates the form of the honors received (as the false *philotimía* does), but also the content, that is, that honors received are authentic and freely given. The way to reach them is, as Cyrus's words and actions shows, through *εὐεργεσία* —exemplary behavior focused on performing good acts for the community. Alcibiades and Critias' attitude is the reverse of Cyrus; in the same sentence that introduces them Xenophon makes clear the terrible damage that they did to Athens (“Σωκράτει

32 Cf. M. Tamiolaki, 'Emotion and Persuasion in Xenophon's *Cyropaedia*', *Phoenix* 70 (2016), 40-63, at 58-9.

33 Cf. *Hell.* VI.1.6 for the characterization of Jaso of Pherae as φιλόπονος (see also VI.1.15-16).

34 J. Farber, 'The *Cyropaedia* and Hellenistic Kingship', *The American Journal of Philology*, 100 (1979), 497-514, at 505, has given excessive weight to this passage, reading *philotimía* as an ambivalent trait.. See also W. Shubar, 'Das hellenistische Königsideal nach Inschriften un Papyri', *Archiv für Papyrusforschung un Verwandte Gebiete* XII (1937), 1-27, at 8.

35 That the correct leadership can reorient false *philotimía* in order to transform it into a positive force appears also in *Mem.* III.1.10 and *Oec.* XII, 15.

ὄμλητὰ γενομένω Κριτίας τε καὶ Ἀλκιβιάδης πλεῖστα κακὰ τὴν πόλιν ἐποιησάτην”, *Mem.*, I.2.12.1-3). Unconcerned with good actions, Critias and Alcibiades are a living example of perverted *philotimía*: they desire honors only by their form —false, forced honors.

What separates the desire for true honors from the desire for false honors? Where is the psychological difference between Cyrus and Critias or Alcibiades? Xenophon himself gives us an answer to this question in identifying the main virtues Socrates should have taught to his companions (*Mem.*, I.2.17-19): in *sophrosúne* and *enkráteia* lies the power to correctly drive the desires while maintaining a virtuous *philotimía*.

The virtue that can be learned: *sophrosúne* / *enkráteia*

Regarding the conception of the psychological structure presented in *Hiero*, Xenophon differentiates between a stable *philotimia* given by nature, and another aspect alterable by experience. If, as stated in *Memorabilia* I.2.17, Socrates could have taught *sophrosúne* to Critias and Alcibiades, then these psychological virtues are part of the *psukhé* that can be learned. Indeed, the notion that only through intense and persistent exercise is it possible to maintain the good condition of the *psukhé* appears in *Memorabilia* (I.2.19-23, II.1.29-33) and *Cyropaedia* (VII.7.75). This is consistent with Cyrus' characterization: although the prince's enkratic character is emphasized throughout *Cyropaedia*, it is not listed among the natural features of his *psúkhe* in I.2.1, but as one of those virtues achieved through training. In this way, *sophrosúne* and *enkráteia* appear in the narration as an aspect of the psychological formation of the prince and specifically as a description of Persian education.

It has been argued that *sophrosúne* “apparaît chez Xénophon comme un parfait synonyme de l' *enkráteia*”³⁶. Bevilacqua, who also claims that the two terms are practically synonymous, differentiates between the specific character of *enkráteia* from a more generic and broader *sophrosúnne*³⁷. Both concepts are required for the realization of good deeds and, therefore appear as the center of human virtue³⁸ as is said by the Armenian prince Tigranes (*Cyr.*, III.1.16) and by Socrates to Euthydemus (*Mem.*, IV.5.2).

Its origin as a source of all good actions makes *sophrosune/enkráteia* a capital virtue for the political life and especially for the rulers given that their individual behavior has repercussions throughout society³⁹. This is evidenced in the discussion between Socrates and Aristippus on how to educate a ruler so that he has a correct psychological structure. It is established there that the ruler must have the enkratic ability to set aside the satisfaction of his own pleasures in order to pursue the satisfaction of the common good (*Mem.*, II.1.1-6). The desires that a ruler must be able to relegate are especially somatic (food and drink, II.1.2, rest and sexual appetites, II.1.3), which may well be attributed to the context of debate with the Cyrenaic philosophy⁴⁰. However, it is legitimate to ask about the desire for honors — is it necessary to postpone that desire as well? As we have seen, what is necessary is to exercise *philotimia* with *sophrúsne/enkráteia*, in order to eliminate the desire for false honors⁴¹. These false desires are the ones that should be put aside by exercising self-control.

36 L.-A. Dorion, *Xénophon. Mémoires. Livre I* (Paris, 2000), 87. Cf. G.J. de Vries, 'sophorúne en grec classique', *Mnemosyne* 11 (1943), 92; H. North, *Sophrosyne: self-knowledge and self-restraint in Greek literature* (Ithaca, 1966), 128, 130-131; and Due (n. 6), 170. About *enkráteia* also Cf. D. Morrison, 'La psychologie morale de Xénophon', in M. Narcy & A. Tordesillas (eds.), *Xenophon et Socrate* (Paris, 2008), 22.

37 F. Bevilacqua, *Memorabili di Senofonte, a cura di Fiorenza Bevilacqua* (Torino 2010), 53 n. 241, 144, 148. As she, I use the “*sophrosúne/enkráteia*” formula.

38 Due (n. 6), 180. E. Buzzeti, *The 'Middle Road' of Socratic Political Philosophy: Xenophon's Presentation of Socrates' View of Virtue in the Memorabilia* (Diss. Boston College 1998), 44, takes a different approach and holds that *enkráteia* is not a virtue, but the foundation of virtue.

39 E. Biondi, 'Ciro pastore nella Ciropedia senofonte: I significati di un'immagine', *Mediterraneo antico* XVII (2014), 609-32, at 623.

40 About the role of aristippean philosophy here, see D. Johnson, 'Aristippus at the Crossroads: the Politics of Pleasure in Xenophon's Memorabilia', *Polis* 26 (2009), 204-22, and Illarraga (n. 26).

41 Tamiolaki (n. 31), 58 has shown how *Cyropaedia* and *Memorabilia* shared the distinction between noble and depraved pleasures, where long-term pleasure, earned through virtue and toil, are positive pleasures. We could associate

What guides the natural condition of *philotimía* (that is, whether an individual will direct his desire to true honors or false honors) lies in education and permanent training in *sophrosúne/enkrátēia*. With *sophrosúne/enkrátēia*, *philotimía* is the cause of εὐεργεσία. The Syrian king Agesilaus' self-control illustrates this (*Ages.*, V.1-5): his ability to gift his own food to honor his guests (V.1), his abstinence from sleep when necessary (V.2), and his war effort alongside his soldiers (V.3) earns him the admiration and recognition⁴².

Cyrus is the best example of the impact of the *sophrosune/enkrátēia* on the good rule, to the point that when organizing the Persian Empire his own self-control functions as a moral guide that teaches the court to reject reprehensible acts and promotes good deeds (*Cyr.*, VIII.30-33). The gestation of this virtue in Cyrus is (as Socrates proposes to Aristippus) his education. The intense formation of the Persian children has one of its basis in the teaching of the *sophrosúne/enkrátēia* (I.2.8, Cf. VIII.8.15). The education of the Persian *homótimoí* is a permanent exercise and is not restricted to a rigid curriculum but covers every aspect of life⁴³. In this way, learning is carried out through exemplary models (teachers and elders), and unfolds in all everyday areas (such as meals and dinners). So strong is the concern for these virtues that Cixares mention how Persians stand out above all peoples in this respect (IV.1.14).

After a life marked by the *sophrosúne/enkrátēia*, Cyrus dedicates his final moments before dying to advise his sons and heirs. His words start from his own experience and are can therefore be understood as an evaluation of his own political career. When Cyrus describes to his son Tanaoxares the future life of his brother Cambyses the Younger, who will occupy the throne, the *sophrosúne/enkrátēia* appears tacitly. This characterization of the rule in VIII.7.13 summarizes very briefly what is stated in *Mem.*, II.1.1-6: the ruler must set aside his own pleasures in pursuit of the common good. This notion about the political task is similar, in turn, to the one that Cyrus holds in the talk with his father Cambyses the Elder earlier in Cyrus' life (*Cyr.*, I.6.8.).

To persuade with generosity: *philanthropía*

In the same way that in *Hiero* *philotimía* appears as a human desire close to divinity, *philanthropía* is also a characteristic of the gods (*Mem.*, IV.3.6)⁴⁴. It is not, however, something exclusive to them⁴⁵. This concept, which in Xenophon means “showing affection, being kind, beneficent and generous”⁴⁶, is attributed both to Socrates (*Mem.*, I.2.60), and to Xenophon's model rulers Agesilaus and Cyrus.

Socrates' *philanthropós* character is shown by his generosity and his lack of interest in obtaining economic benefit from his disciples, attitudes which make the Athenian philosopher a renowned, famous character (*Mem.*, I.2.61). These positive consequences of a psychology marked by *philanthropía* make it an essential virtue for the good ruler, as Simonides knows: when the people find someone competent and generous who can effectively give them a good life, they will

false honours with depreved pleasures, and true honours with noble pleasures. Cf. *Hell.* VI.1.15.11-12, where Jaso of Pherae teaches his soldiers how hard work brings indulgence (“ὥστε καὶ τοῦτο μεμαθήκασι πάντες οἱ μετ' αὐτοῦ, ὅτι ἐκ τῶν πόνων καὶ τὰ μαλακὰ γίγνεται”)

42 The fact that *sophrosúne/enkrátēia* govern *philotimía* undermines the argument of Whidden (n. 6), 564: “Persia's inability to satisfy Cyrus's indiscriminate, immoderate, and infinite desire for honor raises the question of whether the honors bestowed by any single regime short of a world-state could have satisfied him”. If it is conceded that Cyrus learned *sophrosúne/enkrátēia* in his youth as Whidden (n.6), 545 does, it must rule over any desire. Cyrus' enkratic deeds make it inaccurate to talk about his “indiscriminate, immoderate and infinite desires”

43 See W. Higgins, *Xenophon the Athenian: The Problem of the Individual and the Society of the Polis* (Albany, 1977), 54; Due (n. 6), 15; R. Illarraga, 'El extraño reino de un joven príncipe. Política, educación y justicia en la sociedad persa de la Ciropedia (1, 2, 2-16)', *Quaderni Urbinati di Cultura Classica 116* (2017), 81-102. Cf. Gera (n. 6), 50.

44 O. Gigon, *Kommentar zum zweiten Buch von Xenophons Memorabilien* (Basel, 1956), 90-91. Cf. *Cyr.* VIII.7.25.

45 Dorion (n. 35), 120 n.173. See Xenophon's portrait of *philanthropía* (and piety) in Cyrus the Younger in M. Flower, *Xenophon's Anabasis, or The Expedition of Cyrus* (Oxford and New York, 2012), at 188-94.

46 Due (n. 6), 167.

recognize this man as their political leader (*Hier.*, VIII.9) —thus, legitimate rule is obtained both by fear and love. This political capacity makes *philanthropía* a fundamental desire for the ruler also in order to deal with otherwise irreducible rivals, as is shown by Agesilaus whose his humanitarian attitudes and generous dealings with enemies achieved the submission of citadels impossible to take by force (*Ages.*, I.22).

The first moment in which we see Cyrus' *philanthropía* is in his youth in Median court where the successful efforts of the young prince to achieve the affection of his noble companions and their parents is described (*Cyr.*, I.4.1). *Philotimía* and *philanthropía* are the double origin of these actions in an interaction between virtues that achieves the “true honors” of *Hiero* (VII.9). If true *philotimía* (that is, *philotimía* guided by *sophrosúne/enkrátēia*) desires recognition and approval from εὐεργεσία, it is necessarily a psychological character that encourages generosity and good deeds. This psychological trait is precisely *philanthropía*. In this sense, it is suggestive that the next mention of *philanthropía* in *Cyropaedia* refers directly to the Median friendships obtained by Cyrus' benevolence: thanks to his past generosity Cyrus manages to gather volunteers for the continuation of his successful campaign, which will itself be a source of honors and acknowledgments (*Cyr.*, IV .2.10). This virtuous feedback can also be pointed out in the case of Agesilaus: the generosity that opens the doors of impregnable citadels also brings the honor of taking that fortress. Also, the Spartan king's compassionate attitude towards his enemies will be the same as Cyrus has when he invades Armenia (*Cyr.*, II.4.32, III.1.3). The concessive behavior toward the defeated enemy is, as indicated in *Cyr.*, VII.5.73, a clear signal of *philanthropía* since taking possession of bodies and people defeated in combat is a strictly just fact, but refraining from doing so is a great feat of benevolence.

Philanthropía appears again in two episodes in *Cyropaedia's* last book where Xenophon describes the debates around the organization of the Persian Empire. In its first appearance, Xenophon addresses the problem of the empire's security or stability (ἀσφάλεια). Cyrus has realized that, with his enemies defeated, there is no external enemy that can attack the polity he has organized. On the contrary, the danger comes from his own powerful commanders who might harbor the idea that they could be competent rulers (VIII.1.45-6). Cyrus evaluates the correct course of action, considering that to dissolve his armies and deprive them of their command would damage the military power of the empire, while being openly suspicious would lead to a civil war (VIII.1.47). The answer lies in *philanthropía* —it is the mean to secure strong bonds of friendship between Cyrus and his subordinates, which in turn prevents the emergence of powerful links between potential contenders that lead to dangerous coalitions between intriguers (VIII.1.48-2.1)⁴⁷. The potential of *philanthropía* is indeed a powerful one:

“Πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ διὰ παντὸς ἀεὶ τοῦ χρόνου φιλανθρωπίαν τῆς ψυχῆς ὡς ἐδύνατο μάλιστα ἐνεφάνιζεν, ἡγούμενος, ὥσπερ οὐ ράδιόν ἐστι φιλεῖν τοὺς μισεῖν δοκοῦντας οὐδ' εὐνοεῖν τοῖς κακόνοις, οὕτω καὶ τοὺς γνωσθέντας ὡς φιλοῦσι καὶ εὐνοοῦσιν, οὐκ ἂν δύνασθαι μισεῖσθαι ὑπὸ τῶν φιλεῖσθαι ἡγουμένων” (VIII.2.1.1-5)⁴⁸

“In the first place, he continually made his benevolence of soul every bit as visible as he could, for he believed that just as it is not easy to love those who seem to hate you, or to be well disposed toward those who are ill disposed toward you, so also those known as loving and as being well disposed could not be hated by those who held that they were loved”

47 See V. Gray, 'Xenophon's Eudaimonía', in F. de Luise & A. Stavru, *Studies on Socrates, the Socratics, and the Ancient Socratic Literature* (Sankt Augustin), 56-67, at 64.

48 Here Xenophon puts emphasis on showing how *philanthropía* can be exercised according to one's own economic capacities, regardless of the social position one occupies, as it is also implied in the characterization of Socrates as *philanthropós* in *Memorabilia* (see supra). Cyrus' example serves to show how *philanthropía* can be cultivated both from power and from aspiration to power (VIII.2.2-4).

In a dinner with his most faithful friends, Cyrus is approached by the noble elder Gobryas, deserter of the Assyrian army. Gobryas is truly amazed by Cyrus' generosity:

“Ἄλλ', ἐγώ, ὦ Κῦρε, πρόσθεν μὲν ἡγούμην τούτῳ σε πλεῖστον διαφέρειν ἀνθρώπων τῷ στρατηγικώτατον εἶναι· νῦν δὲ θεοῦς ὄμνυμι ἢ μὴν ἐμοὶ δοκεῖν πλέον σε διαφέρειν φιλάνθρωπία ἢ στρατηγία. Νῆ Δί', ἔφη ὁ Κῦρος· καὶ μὲν δὴ καὶ ἐπιδείκνυμαι τὰ ἔργα πολὺ ἥδιον φιλάνθρωπίας ἢ στρατηγίας. Πῶς δὴ; ἔφη ὁ Γωβρύας. Ὅτι, ἔφη, τὰ μὲν κακῶς ποιοῦντα ἀνθρώπους δεῖ ἐπιδείκνυσθαι, τὰ δὲ εὖ.” (VIII.4.7.3-9.1)

“Cyrus, I held before that you most surpassed human beings in being the most skilled general. Now I swear by the gods that you seem to me to surpass them more by your benevolence than by your generalship'
'Yes, by Zeus,' said Cyrus. 'And I display the works of benevolence with much more pleasure than those of generalship.'
'Why?' said Gobryas.
'Because one must display the one by harming human beings, the other by benefiting them.’”

The importance of *philanthropía* that Gobryas notices and that Cyrus explains is the benefit it brings to the ruled. The capabilities and consequences of war are not denied, but they are placed in the background: if he would be able to choose, Cyrus would prefer to do good rather than harm. In this brief interaction we can be explained the dynamics between generosity and fear that marks Cyrus' political career, described in the *proemium* (I.1.5), the dialogue between Cambyses and Cyrus (I.6.2-46), and the Cyrus' last words to his sons (VIII.7.7, 13). In those passages there are exhortations to benefit friends and to harm the enemies that show the reaches and limits of *philanthropía*: anyone who truly can not be convinced by the generosity is an enemy, and therefore must be annihilated.

To rule with knowledge: *philomatheia*

As a child, Cyrus speaks constantly, to the point that Xenophon calls him “very talkative” (πολυλογώτερος). However, he is quickly justified. The young prince is not a 'chatterbox', but is devoted to finding out why things are as they are. The origin of this perpetual permanent seeking of understanding for the causes is directly identified with Cyrus' *philomathés* personality (I.4.3). *Philomatheía* implies not only curiosity, but the recognition of personal limits, the need to consult with those who already have knowledge, as well as valuing and, in general, dialogue and exchange of opinions⁴⁹. The importance of noticing one's own ignorance and, therefore, the impulse to seek advice from those who have superior knowledge is a characteristic that Cambyses sees in his son (I.6.43). Indeed, even after having demonstrated his enormous capacity to conquer and rule, Cyrus continues to ask his subordinates to teach him what he may not know, as shown in the talk about how a beautiful parade should be performed (VIII.3.2). In this sense, *philomatheía* not only encourages Cyrus to be open only to mere words, but also prompts him to involve himself with those who show knowledge and the ability to transmit it —these characteristics, precisely, are praised to Chrysantas in an intimate meeting with Cyrus' closest commanders (VIII.4.11).

The desire for knowledge and its enjoyment are the fundamental characteristic of the philosopher (*Oec.*, XVI, 9⁵⁰). For Socrates (and for Xenophon in *Cyr.*, I.2.1) this enjoyment and desire to learn is found in the *psukhé*, and is especially linked with the passion for acquiring

49 Also, as Sandridge (n. 6), 49 points out, the *philomatheia* involves an aptitude for learning: “the ability to excel in contest of learning and to pick up lessons quickly”

50 “πρῶτον ἂν ἠδέως μανθάνειν (φιλοσόφου γὰρ μάλιστα ἐστὶν ἀνδρός) ὅπως ἂν ἐγώ” “I think I should be glad to learn, for this is the philosopher's way”

knowledge useful for the good management of cities and men (*Mem.*, IV.1.2)⁵¹. This knowledge leads to the ability to confer *eudaimonia* on others, whether individuals or societies, and also makes the ruled more obedient (*Cyr.* I.6.22). In other words, the political power of philosophy lies in a *philomatheia* oriented to a formal knowledge with positive practical consequences for the society⁵². This effective, practical aspect of *philomatheia* also has a creative aspect. This is directly presented in Cambyses' advices to Cyrus on how to face enemies: it is necessary not to confine oneself to only established knowledge, but also to invent and create new strategies (*Cyr.*, I.6.38). This interaction between knowledge acquisition and innovation is one of the central characteristics of Cyrus' ascent and consolidation of power, and can be observed in his interest in learning how to ride (I.3.3, I.3.15), the creation of a Persian cavalry corps (IV.3.4), the expansion of the army on the basis of *homótimoi* armament (II.1.9), his supervision of the invention of new tactics (II.3.17-20), and the creation of the infamous scythed chariots (VI.1.28).

The interaction between virtues

The interaction between the three virtues by nature (*philotimía*, *philanthropía* and *philomatheía*) and the virtue by learning (*sophrosune/enkráteia*) marks Cyrus' psychology, which is the origin of his successful political career. This relationship, schematically, could be represented as follows:

$$sophrosúne / enkráteia \{ (\rightarrow) philotimía \leftrightarrow (philomatheía) \leftrightarrow philanthropía \}$$

The *sophrosúne/enkráteia*, or virtue learned through education, works as a guarantee for the good behaviour of the whole system, but it has a more direct impact on *philotimía* since it is the condition that orientates desire towards a search for true honor. The ambition of true honor contributes the necessary passion for the concretization of the *eúergesia* that is born of the actions undertaken with *philanthropía*. In turn, *philomatheía* motorizes the obtaining of knowledge that is necessary both for the performance of good deeds that arise from *philanthropía*, and for the techniques necessary for obtaining honor. This psychological scheme of three closely related natural desires along with a guiding virtue allows us to understand the balancing of priorities between Cyrus' psychological impulses⁵³.

The particular balance that occurs in Cyrus' *psukhé* is the origin of its exceptionality, and

51 “ἀλλὰ τῶν τὰς ψυχὰς πρὸς ἀρετὴν εὖ πεφυκότων ἐφιέμενος, ἐτεκμαίρετο δὲ τὰς ἀγαθὰς φύσεις ἐκ τοῦταχὺ τε μαθάνειν οἷς προσέχουεν καὶ μνημονεύειν ἃ [ἂν] μάθοιεν καὶ ἐπιθυμῆν τῶν μαθημάτων πάντων δι' ὃν ἔστιν οἰκόν τε καλῶς οἰκεῖν καὶ πόλιν καὶ τὸ ὅλον ἀνθρώποις τε καὶ τοῖς ἀνθρωπίνους πράγμασιν εὖ χρῆσθαι” (IV.1.2.3-8) “He recognised these excellent natures by their quickness to learn whatever subject they studied, ability to remember what they learned, and desire for every kind of knowledge on which depend good management of a household and estate and tactful dealing with men and the affairs of men”. This passage serves to explain why Cyrus, in the last few moments of his life, is concerned with matters concerning the good future of the Empire, rather than metaphysical speculations. *contra* Whidden (n. 6), 550.

52 Departing from Araspas's reflection on having “philosophized” with Eros (VI.1.41), Bartlett (n.10), 153 holds that Cyrus, being a “cold king” (VIII.4.22-23), never having never experienced any erotic passion and therefore having never philosophized, therefore must not have followed and for that reason he have not follow the Delphic-Socratic dictum “Know Thyself” (*Mem.* IV.2.24). See also Whidden (n.6), 549. This argument is doubtful for at least three reasons. (i) These words are spoken by Araspas, a young man deeply in love who also wants to show Cyrus that he can carry out the mission entrusted. Although there is no reason to distrust him, neither is there any reason to think he is right —Araspas is not a personage characterized by philosophical capabilities. (ii) Araspas does not say that there is philosophizing *by* Eros, but *with* Eros. Therefore, the erotic impulse is not presented as a necessary condition for philosophizing. (iii) Finally, we need to point out that Eros is characterized as ‘unjust’— how could Araspas reach to any correct conclusions given that he philosophized with an unjust and powerful partner? Although it is never said that Cyrus philosophizes, the intimate link between *philomatheia* and *philosophía*, and the repeated and proven *philomathés* character of Cyrus, forces us to acknowledge that he is not an unthinking individual. See also Gray (n. 45), 60-1 for a Cyrus both *eudaimonic* and with knowledge of himself.

53 Sandridge (n. 6), 38-40, for example, has raised the possibility of a hierarchy between *philotimía* and *philanthropía*, opting for the prioritizing *philanthropía* of the latter. Our alternative allows us to maintain the fundamental weight of *philanthropía* at the same level of Cyrus’s paramount *philotimía*.

helps to explain features that have bothered some scholars. Faced with positions that highlight Cyrus's self-interest⁵⁴, Danzig⁵⁵ has responded that self-interest and *philanthropía* are not mutually exclusive traits, and has correctly pointed out that “selfless behavior is not a standard to be found in Xenophon, so it would be wrong to criticize Cyrus for lack of it”⁵⁶. Moreover, the psychological scheme we have presented shows that self-interest is necessary for a political project that aims to improve the life of the society ruled. There are two reasons for this. The most obvious is that *philanthropía* —the force that leads to good deeds— is a personal desiderative impulse, proper to the *psukhé* of an individual, and not an external imposition. The second reason is that the strong and constant pursuit of the common good can only be achieved by an extremely exhausting degree of political effort, as Hiero and Aristippus insist. The necessary incentive to undertake this task lies in the ambition for true honor, that is, honors that have their origin in a philanthropic impulse.

Smith Pangle, when mentioning Danzig's thesis on the compatibility between self-interest and beneficence, argues that he “does not address the disappointed hopes of Cyrus's more impressive followers”⁵⁷. Much of the problem of her argument is summed up in this quote. Her criticism departs from a position of individualism alien to *Cyropaedia*: neither Cyrus nor Xenophon cares about the joys or hopes of a few followers. We must investigate Cyrus for his exceptional political ability (as Xenophon said in the *proemium*), not for his ability to please the personal desires of all his followers. This strongly communitarian conception is the one behind Cyrus' solution to the problem of the boys and their robes⁵⁸, reminiscent of Socrates's warning to Glaucon at the beginning of *Republic*, IV: “[t]he object on which we fixed our eyes on the establishment of our state was not the exceptional happiness of any one class but the greatest possible happiness of the city as a whole” (420b4-6). To satisfy the political ambitions of Cyrus' “more impressive followers” would not only harm the society —since Cyrus is the best possible ruler—, but also harm the very happiness of these individuals: as Gray has correctly pointed out, *eudaimonía*, both individual and social, has a fundamental component in the recognition of one's own limitations⁵⁹.

Conclusion

Cyrus rules and dies happy (VIII.7.26-28). During his reign, thanks to his *philanthropía*, he discouraged any potential rival from wanting to take his place (VIII.1.45-8). We must understand, then, that Simónides' 'guide to political rule' has achieved its results, since Cyrus achieves the goal that the poet proposes to Hiero —Cyrus has ruled by doing good for his friends so that his enemies can not successfully oppose him and therefore he has had the best of rewards: to be happy without being envied (*Hier.*, XI.15).

Cyrus' good deeds, marked by his *philanthropía*, have achieved for him solid and compact support from his people, his soldiers and his commanders, even those who once might have wished to supplant him. The virtuous functioning of Cyrus' psychological structure is consistent with the pursuit of *eudaimonía* as described by Gray: “[t]he motive for the leader to foster this *eudaimonía* to followers is the pursuit of his own *eudaimonía* because he must use them for success. [...] Because Xenophon's rulers are dependent on followers to flourish, they have a vested interest in giving them *eudaimonia*, because this means the capacities that will best assist in furthering the

54 See V. Azoulay, *Xénophon et les grâces du pouvoir* (Paris, 2004), 323, n. 229; Carlier (n. 6), 153; Bartlett (n. 10), 146, 153; Cf. de Romilly (n. 50), 140-141.

55 Danzig (n. 6), esp. 504-511.

56 Ibid., 509. See also Morrison (n. 36), 14.

57 Smith Pangle (n. 11), 317 n. 17. In some way, this is also also Azoulay (n.54), 325 perspective: “la philanthropía implique une inégalité fondamentale de tous les hommes face au souverain, quels que soit leur rang ou leur statut...”.

58 See G. Danzig, 'Big boys, Little Boys: Justice and Law in Xenophon's *Cyropaedia* and *Memorabilia*', *Polis* 26 (2009), 242-266 and Illarraga (n. 42), 96-102.

59 Gray (n. 48), 61. See also M. Tamiolaki, 'Virtue and Leadership in Xenophon: Ideal Leaders or Ideal Losers', F. Hobden & C. Tuplin, *Xenophon: Ethical Principles and Historical Enquiry* (Leiden, 2012), 563-89, at 576-8.

leader's success"⁶⁰. Cyrus' *psukhé* is marked by this virtuous feedback, also proposed by Simonides in the search for a good and happy ruler.

Nobody envies Cyrus. As the Socratic ruler of *Mem.* II.1.1-6, Cyrus lives without any of what other men understand as pleasures, to the point of being called by Chrysantas a "cold king" (*Cyr.* VIII.4.22). But, despite what Chrysantas thinks (or Aristippus in *Memorabilia*), Cyrus' extraordinary *psukhé* allows him to make of this postponement of pleasures a virtuous characteristic in regards to his own *eudaimonía*: to have *sophrosúnue/enkráteia* and to be simultaneously *philanthropótatos*, *philomathéstatos* and *philotimótatos* configures a *psukhé* where self-interest and social interest converge. More *eudaimonia* for the ruled society means, in turn, more *eudaimonia* for Cyrus.

It has been said that Xenophon praises Cyrus "because he 'forgets' every political good higher than stability"⁶¹. Indeed, Cyrus is praised for this very reason. But we must keep in mind that, as we have seen, for Xenophon, stability can only be the consequence of a benevolent rule that favors the common good. Cyrus highlights this in the last moments of his life: a ruler only can only have stability through faithful followers, and faithful followers they only can only be won through generosity (VIII.7.13). As we have seen, for a ruler to be as beneficent as Cyrus was, he must possess the complex psychological structure we have analyzed. It is almost what Johnson has pointed out: an "inhuman mixture of continence and greed"⁶². It is indeed an extraordinary mixture, but it is not an impossible one. The complex mixture, Cyrus' *psukhé*, is not inhuman⁶³ but only very rare. It is so uncommon that Xenophon only finds in Cyrus the example of how the example of Cyrus —only in his *psukhé* occurs the unlikely coincidence of a correct predisposition by nature and a good education can converge. It is so unusual that after his death the polity he has built cannot be sustained and begins to go into decline. How exceptional is the psychological condition of possibility for a stable rule (and therefore, a good rule) is the fundamental lesson that Xenophon gives in *Cyropaedia*: against all romanticism we have to take into account of the limits that society and human nature imposes on politics.

60 Ibidem, 63. For the opposite position, see Faulkner (n. 8), 170-2, who argues that Cyrus is not happy. Faulkner presents two arguments. The first problem he postulates is that Cyrus' happiness depends on his reputation. For this reason, Faulkner wonders what happens after Cyrus' death —did his sons maintain their father's reputation? Although it is true that Cyrus asks his children to summon the Persians and allies after his death, he means this as an invitation to his funeral, so that they may all celebrate Cyrus' good life. There does not seem to be another reason for the summoning, given that Cyrus seems convinced that his soul will leave the world (VIII.7.26) or, at least, that he can no longer suffer evil (VIII.7.27). This gives us ample room to think that he is authentically satisfied, and has no concerns regarding his reputation. The other problem identified by Faulkner (n. 8), 171 is also presented in the form of a question: "is it reasonable for an extraordinary man to find happiness in the opinion of ordinary men, precisely those incapable of judging the deed of a superior man?". As we have said before (see *supra*), this individualist approach does not take into account that Cyrus does not make evaluations departing from certain individuals, but from the community as a whole.

61 Barlett (n. 10), 153.

62 Johnson (n. 6), 303.

63 After all, Cyrus needs time to learn, makes mistakes, and dies.